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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
merce. Whether it is a regulation is to be determined by examination of
the economic effects of the tax.'7 This would seem to be a fair summary
of the position of Mr. Justice Stone and current majority of the Court
as inferable from the instant case. Whether this position will continue to
prevail is a question for the future.'8
A. C. G.
CORPORATIONS-INDENTURE LIMITATION ON BONDHOLDER'S RIGHT OF Ac-
TION-REFERENCE FROM BOND TO INDENTURE-[Michigan] .- Plaintiff was the
holder of past due and unpaid bonds secured by a trust indenture. The
bonds contained the following provision: "reference is hereby made [to the
indenture] for a description of the property mortgaged and the nature and
extent of the security and the rights of the holders of said bonds in regard
thereto and the terms and conditions upon which said bonds are issued
and secured." The indenture provided that proceedings in law or equity
could be instituted and maintained only in the name of the indenture trustee.'
Plaintiff sought to recover on the bonds; defendant contended that plaintiff
was not the proper party to bring suit because of the restrictive provision
contained in the indenture and reference thereto in the bonds. Held, the
plaintiff had the right to maintain the action.2
It is well settled that an individual's right to sue on corporate bonds can
be so restricted that only the trustee named in the indenture can bring
suit.3 If such restriction is found on the face of the bond itself, there is no
question as to its validity. The problem usually arises where the bond
refers the holder to a restrictive provision in the trust indenture. In these
cases the question turns on whether the reference is sufficient. 4 In the in-
stant case the members of the court agreed in result but disagreed as to the
basis of the decision. The majority of judges felt that, to be effective, the
restriction must be on the face of the bond and that therefore the adequacy
17. The evidence of regulatory effect in the instant case-non-discrimina-
tion and non-cumulability-is perhaps an unsubtle gauge for measuring
subtle relations. But there seems to be no reason why expert evidence should
not be considered. Cf. Mann, Is American "Balkanization" Unavoidable?
(Winter 1939-1940) 9 The American Scholar 52.
18. Three judges dissented strongly in the instant case. It is worthy
noting that Mr. Justice Stone led a somewhat analogous revolt in the field
of state taxation of federal instrumentalities. See Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466.
1. This provision further provided that only when the trustee refused to
institute suit on the request of the needed number of bondholders can these
bondholders institute suit in their own name and for the benefit of all the
bondholders.
2. Guardian Depositors Corp. v. David Stott Flour Mills Inc. (Mich.
1939) 289 N. W. 122.
3. For a collection of cases, see Note (1937) 108 A. L. R. 90.
4. What is a sufficient reference varies in different jurisdictions. For
a collection of cases in which the restriction was held binding, see Notp
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 96. For cases holding restriction not binding, see Note
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 100. McClelland and Fisher, Law of Corporate Mort-
gage Bond Issues (1937) 139.
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of the reference was immaterial5 The minority, on the contrary, was of
the opinion that the reference was not sufficient to apprise the bondholder
of the fact that his right to sue at law on the bonds was affected by the
indenture provision and that therefore the bonds' unconditional obligation
to pay must prevail.8
The view of the majority was derived from Cunningham v. Pressed Steel
Car Co.' a case decided by the Supreme Court of New York. From this
case the following language was quoted: "If there was to be a restriction
upon defendant's obligation to pay at maturity, then the bondholder was
entitled to receive notice thereof in reasonably clear language expressed on
the face of the bond. The mere reference to the indenture for a statement
of the rights of the holders is not enough to take away by implication,
drawn from another instrument, plaintiff's right to sue upon defendant's
positive acknowledgement of an unconditional promise to pay the debt."8
Conceding that this language is open to the construction put upon it by the
majority of judges in the instant case, a matter which admits of serious
doubt, 9 the quoted language should be read in the light of a prior statement
in the Cunningham case which is as follows: "The reference to the inden-
ture did not fairly place the bondholder on notice of any restriction upon
defendant's obligation to pay at maturity, so as to preclude action at that
time by individual bondholders to sue for and collect the principal."10
The New York Court of Appeals in affirming the Cunningham case re-
peated only the latter statement.11 Later New York cases cite the Cunning-
ham case as not requiring the restriction to be on the face of the bond, but
hold, in accordance with the view of the minority of judges in the instant
case and the prevailing weight of authority, that a restriction on the right
to sue is binding if the reference fairly places the bondholder on notice that
he is to look to the trust indenture for his rights in case of nonpayment
at maturity.12
5. Nevertheless, the majority held that the reference was sufficient.
6. Guardian Depositors Corp. v. David Stott Flour Mills, Inc. (Mich.
1939) 289 N. W. 122, 125. In the opinion the minority is referred to as a
dissent. However, it concurred in result and dissented only as to the rule
of law advanced by the majority.
7. (1933) 238 App. Div. 624, 265 N. Y. S. 256.
8. Cunningham v. Pressed Steel Car Co. (1933) 238 App. Div. 624, 265
N. Y. S. 256, 259.
9. In the statement quoted from the Cunningham case by the majority
in the instant case, the word "notice" could mean notice of a sufficient refer-
ence, and in the next sentence the phrase "mere reference" could be inter-
preted as insufficient reference.
10. Cunningham v. Pressed Steel Car Co. (1933) 238 App. Div. 624, 265
N. Y. S. 256, 259.
11. Cunningham v. Pressed Steel Car Co. (1934) 263 N. Y. 671, 672,
189 N. E. 750, 751.
12. Porte v. Polachek (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1934) 150 Misc. 891, 270 N. Y. S.
807; Davidge v. Lake Placid Co. (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1934) 151 Misc. 542, 271
N. Y. S. 714, rev'd (Sup. Ct. 1934) 152 Misc. 307, 273 N. Y. S. 522. Also in a
recent federal case both the majority and dissenting judge cite the Cunning-
ham ease and come to the conclusion that such restrictions qualifying the
bondholder's right to sue are binding if sufficient reference is made from the
bond thereto. Dunham v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry. (C. C. A. 2,
1939) 106 F. (2d) 1, 2, 4.
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The view of the majority represents a step beyond any reported decision
and can be explained in part by a mistaken interpretation of the language
in the New York case and a desire not to be confronted by the difficulty of
determining when a reference is sufficient. 13  L. M. B.
CRIMINAL LAW- PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM.INATION - RECORDS
KEPT By AccusED--[New York].-A New York statute' makes it a mis-
demeanor for the driver of a motor truck or bus, who has been on duty for
an aggregate of ten in any fourteen consecutive hours, again to go on duty
without at least eight consecutive hours off duty. The statute further pro-
vides that the driver shall keep records, showing his time on duty, for
exhibition on demand by any state policeman or peace officer. At the time
of his arrest, defendant's time card showed merely the hour at which he
had begun driving and the amount of time he had had off duty. By com-
paring these items with the time of arrest, the police officer concluded that
defendant had been driving for more than the statutory number of hours.
The time card and the testimony of the arresting officer were the only
evidence offered on behalf of the people. Held, that the introduction of the
time card in evidence did not unconstitutionally compel defendant to in-
criminate himself.2
The basis of the decision was that the time card, upon which no final
entry had been posted, showed nothing incriminatory on its face, because
supplemental testimony by the officer was needed in order to prove the
duration of the driving period. This case therefore places the time card in
the same category as reports of pharmacists,3 pawnbrokers, 4 and narcotics
dealers, 5 which may constitute evidence of an infraction of the law.6 The
13. "By thus requiring express notice on the bond, we preclude repeated
litigation to determine whether the referential language in any kind of
bond issue is adequate or not. We eliminate once for all the vexing problem
of negotiable corporate bonds, which is not questioned in the instant case."
Guardian Depositors Corp. v. David Stott Flour Mills, Inc. (Mich. 1939)
289 N. W. 122, 123.
1. N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Labor Law, sec. 167.
2. People v. Creeden (N. Y. 1939) 24 N. E. (2d) 105.
3. State v. Smith (1888) 74 Iowa 580, 38 N. W. 492; State v. Cummins
(1888) 76 Iowa 133, 40 N. W. 124; State v. Huff (1888) 76 Iowa 200, 40
N. W. 720; State v. Elliott (1891) 45 Kan. 525, 26 Pac. 55; Commonwealth
v. Stevens (1892) 155 Mass. 291, 29 N. E. 508; People v. Henwood (1900)
123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W. 70; State v. Davis (1892) 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W.
p94; State ex rel McClory v. Donovan (1901) 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709.
4. Launder v. Chicago (1884) 111 Ill. 291, 253 Am. Rep. 625; St. Joseph
v. Levin (1895) 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W. 101. But see id. at 102 that in a
criminal proceeding, the pawnbroker could not be required to produce the
book to be used as evidence against him, or to permit an examination of it
for that purpose, because to do so would be an invasion of his constitutional
right.
5. United States v. Sherry (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1923) 294 Fed. 684.
6. But see Pople ex rel. Ferguson v. Reardon (1910) 197 N. Y. 236, 90
N. E. 829, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141, where a statute taxing transfers of
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